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HOW MUCH IS “SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE”
AND HOW BIG IS A “SIGNIFICANT GAP”?:
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ATTORNEY
FULL EMPLOYMENT ACT
SUSAN LORDE MARTIN*
ABSTRACT
The late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia described
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as “a model of ambiguity or
indeed even self-contradiction.” Legal wags have also described
the Act as the Telecommunications Attorney Full Employment Act.
Twenty years after the Act became law, it is still being interpreted
by courts all over the country and costing taxpayers millions of
dollars as local governments defend their telecom decisions in
lawsuits. The Act’s basic notion was to allow local zoning authorities to maintain their control over their territories with a few
new limitations that would encourage cell phone service companies to provide access to everyone. This Article focuses on two of
the Act’s limitations on local governments when they want to deny
a request to construct a cell phone tower. The Act requires such a
denial to be supported by substantial evidence, and it prohibits
local governments from preventing a telecommunications company
from closing a significant gap in cell phone service. The Article concludes that Congress should amend the Act to reflect a changed
telecommunications landscape and direct the FCC to issue rules
that clarify the contentious issues. All stakeholders should recognize that alternative conflict resolution techniques initiated when
a tower project is first considered could eliminate costly litigation
and benefit all stakeholders.

*Cypres Family Distinguished Professor of Legal Studies in Business, Zarb
School of Business, Hofstra University. Research for this Article was supported
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INTRODUCTION
The late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia described the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act)1 as “a model of
ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction.”2 Legal wags have
also described the Act as the Telecommunications Attorney Full
Employment Act.3 Twenty years after the Act became law, it is
still being interpreted by courts all over the country, including
the U.S. Supreme Court, and costing taxpayers millions of dollars
as local governments defend their telecom decisions in lawsuits.4
One might think that after twenty years of litigation, local
governments would know which telecommunications facilities
have to be approved under federal law and, if they are not going
to approve an application to construct a facility, how to do it in a
way that is sustainable by a court. But it is understandable that
local governments are inadequate to the task.5 Generally, they
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999). Seth P. Waxman, a
solicitor general in the Clinton administration, described the Act as “the single
most poorly drafted statute ever enacted by Congress .... There is no plain language in that statute.” Stephen Labaton, Slew of Supreme Court Cases to
Focus on ‘96 Telecom Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com
/2001/10/01/technology/01TELE.html?pagewanted=al.
3 Cybertelecom, Telecommunications Act of 1996 (2006), http://www.cybertele
com.org/notes/telecomact.htm [https://perma.cc/P69U-H3YC]; Susan C. Norton,
Defining Social Policy: Should Telecommunications Regulation Be Devolved
to the States 20 n.28 (2009), available from UMI Microform 1461501,
ProQuest LLC, Ann Arbor, MI; Adam Thierer, Will the FCC’s Nat’l Broadband Plan Be “Full Employment for Lawyers”?, TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT,
Feb. 24, 2010, https://www.techliberation.com/2010/02/24/will-the-fccs-natl
-broadband-plan-be-full-employment-for-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/C624-JQRM]
(noting the FCC Chairman’s Chief of Staff’s remark that the “FCC is doing
everything it can to provide full employment for telecom lawyers”).
4 See Benjamin L. Meersman, Note, You Can’t Hear Me Now: The Ambiguous Language of the Telecommunications Act of 1996’s Tower Siting Provision, 39
J. CORP. L. 437 (2014); Dina Neda Rezvani, Can You Hear Me Now? The Race
to Provide America with Universal, High-Speed Wireless Coverage, 9 WASH. J.L.
TECH. & ARTS 115 (2013); Harold Furchtgott-Roth & Arielle Roth, Answering
Four Questions on the Anniversary of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 68
FED. COMM. L.J. 83, 83 (2015–16) (noting the Act’s enactment on Feb. 8, 1996
and its “deeply contentious” legacy).
5See, e.g., Nat’l Tower, LLC v. Plainville Zoning Bd., 297 F.3d 14, 20 (1st
Cir. 2002); Second Generation Props., LP v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620,
629 (1st Cir. 2002).
1
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are made up of lay people when it comes to telecommunications
issues, with very limited resources,6 going against very wellfinanced, very experienced professionals in the telecommunications
industry.7 Thus, the best case is being made on one side of disputes
and, often, a poor case on the side of local residents and taxpayers.8
One could argue that the purpose of the Act is facilitated by this
arrangement. The Act describes its purpose as “encourag[ing] the
rapid deployment of new telecommunication technologies”9 and,
therefore, the Act does not allow state or local governments to
effectively “prohibit … the ability of any entity to provide any
interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.”10 On the other
hand, at a time when the “little guy” on “Main Street” feels disenfranchised by the power of “Big Business,” this arrangement
can seem very unfair (even though the “little guys” want seamless cell phone service).11
6 See, e.g., Nat’l Tower, 297 F.3d at 20 (noting that “local authorities are
frequently lay member boards without many resources”); Second Generation
Props., 313 F.3d at 629 (stating “[l]ocal zoning boards are lay citizen boards”).
7 See, e.g., MetroPCS N.Y., LLC v. Vill. of E. Hills, 764 F. Supp. 2d 441,
445–46 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (concerning a village zoning board claiming it was
not familiar with telecom applications and technical jargon and hiring one
unlicensed and uncertified “expert” opposing telecom company’s several experts). See also New York SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Vill. of Floral Park, 812 F. Supp.
2d 143, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (Verizon presenting testimony of eight expert
witnesses and thirteen sworn affidavits, technical reports and exhibits; Vill.
of Floral Park presenting no experts, letters from fifteen residents, and testimony of ten residents which included statements of opposition based on,
inter alia, health concerns (impermissible under the Act)). Local governments
may not regulate the siting of cell phone facilities on the basis of environmental effects of radio frequency emissions (including concerns about health) if
the facilities are in compliance with FCC regulations. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv)
(1994 & Supp. V 1995).
8 See, e.g., MetroPCS New York, F. Supp. 2d at 445–46; see also New York
SMSA, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 150.
9 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
10 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2012).
11 See, e.g., Andrew Dys, Clover Zoning Board Denies Controversial Cell
Tower, THE HERALD (Clover, SC), May 26, 2016, http://www.heraldonline.com
/news/local/news-columns-blogs/andrew-dys/article80216227.html [https://
perma.cc/ZFJ2-UWQ4] (interviewing owner of home across street from proposed
tower: “‘The little guy won’ .... [T]ower companies choose poor neighborhoods for
towers ... where people have no voice or money to fight back.”); Katy Macek,
New Cell Site Frustrates Residents, Officials, CHIPPEWA HERALD (Chippewa
Falls, WI), Apr. 28, 2016, 2016 WLNR 12918409 (quoting a concerned neighbor:
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This Article focuses on two of the Act’s limitations on local
governments when they want to deny a request to construct a
cell phone tower. The Act requires such a denial to be “supported
by substantial evidence contained in a written record.”12 On its
face it sounds simple, but as a practical matter it must be hard
to know what support is required.13 The U.S. Supreme Court
was still explaining the language in 2015,14 and other courts
continue to explain it to this day.15 Similarly, although courts
have accepted that a denial preventing a telecommunications
company from closing a “significant gap” in cell phone service is
equivalent to prohibiting the provision of cell phone service,16 it
is still unclear what constitutes a significant gap.17
This Article starts with a brief background of the Act and
then discusses the “substantial evidence” language: methods of
providing substantial evidence, and courts’ interpretations of how
much evidence and what kind of evidence is substantial. The Article discusses the different ways courts have determined whether
significant gaps in cell phone service exist and are the equivalent of prohibiting the provision of cell phone service. The Article
concludes that twenty years of experience should be sufficient to
stem the tide of resources wasted on litigating the legality of local decisions on cell phone tower siting. Because that is obviously
“cell phone company seems to have a lot of say, maybe even more than a community and its elected officials”); Peter McGuire, Benton Cell Tower Sparks
Outrage from Residents, MORNING SENTINEL (Waterville, ME), Aug. 12, 2015,
2015 WLNR 23814832 (quoting owner of home adjacent to proposed cell tower:
“Somebody has to stand up for the little guy.”).
12 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2012).
13 T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808 (2015).
14 Id.
15 See, e.g., Global Tower Assets, LLC v. Town of Rome, 810 F.3d 77 (1st
Cir. 2016) (cell tower in Maine); Stout & Co. v. City of Bel Aire, No. 2:15-cv09323-JTM, 2016 WL 3759440 (D. Kan. July 14, 2016) (cell tower in Kansas);
Cellular S. Real Estate, Inc. v. City of Mobile, No. 15-00387-CG-B, 2016 WL
3746661 (S.D. Ala. July 8, 2016) (cell tower in Alabama); Nextel Commc’ns of
the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 3:14-CV-2409, 2016 WL
1271385 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016) (cell tower in Pennsylvania).
16 See, e.g., Cellular Tel. Co. v. Zoning Bd., 197 F.3d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1999)
(finding “local zoning policies and decisions have the effect of prohibiting wireless communication services if they result in ‘significant gaps’ in the availability of wireless services”).
17 Id.
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not the case,18 Congress should amend the Act to reflect a telecommunications landscape that is very different from the one that
existed when Congress originally passed the Act in 1996. Congress
should direct the FCC to issue rules that clarify the contentious
issues and provide guidelines to local government entities so they
know how to make decisions that follow the rules and that courts
would support, and to telecommunications companies encouraging
them to consult with local residents and make a more concerted
effort to install the least intrusive facilities.19 All stakeholders
should recognize that alternative conflict resolution techniques
initiated when a tower project is first considered could eliminate
costly litigation and benefit all stakeholders.20
I. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
In 1990, there were fewer than six million mobile cellular
subscriptions in the United States.21 By 2000, there were well
over 100 million, and by 2014 that number had more than tripled.22
By 2016, U.S. consumers were looking at their mobile devices
more than eight billion times a day.23 To service these consumers, there are well over 600 thousand cell phone towers in the
United States.24
When President Clinton signed the 1996 Act, it was the
first major change in telecommunications law in over sixty
See generally Meersman, supra note 4.
See Norton, supra note 3, at 20 n.28.
20 Lawrence Susskind & Patrick Field, Dealing with an Angrier Public, Q.
MAG. ASS’N FOR CONFLICT RESOL., July 2012, http://www.cbuilding.org/publica
tion/article/2012/dealing-angrier-public [https://perma.cc/9LKG-VXVV].
21 Telecommunications Revenue (% GDP) in the United States, TRADING
ECONOMICS, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/telecommunica
tions-revenue-percent-gdp-wb-data.html [https://perma.cc/RU8G-YA65].
22 Id.
23 Telecommunications Industry Outlook, DELOITTE, http://www2.deloitte
.com/us/en/pages/technology-media-and-telecommunications/articles/telecom
munications-industry-outlook.htm/ [https://perma.cc/S7NQ-V8EA] (interviewing Craig Wigginton, Vice Chairman & U.S. Telecommunications Leader, Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu Limited).
24 Welcome to AntennaSearch.com!, ANTENNASEARCH.COM, http://www.an
tennasearch.com [https://perma.cc/W2G5-V2J2] (listing 610,671 towers in United
States, including 1,540 added in prior week).
18
19
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years.25 The Act’s specific purpose was to encourage telecommunications providers by creating a less regulated environment and
promoting competition among them so that consumers throughout the country would have better, faster, and cheaper access to
telecommunications services.26 To effect those goals, the Act
puts limitations on the way that states and local governments
may regulate telecommunications facilities but attempts not to
preempt local regulation entirely. States and local governments
may still regulate “the placement, construction, and modification” of telecommunications facilities,27 but they may not “unreasonably discriminate among providers”28 or “prohibit or have
the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.”29 When they receive a request to construct such facilities,
they must respond “within a reasonable period of time”30 and
must support any denial with “substantial evidence contained in
a written record.”31 Any provider may, within thirty days of a
denial or failure to respond, commence a legal action, and courts
are directed to decide these cases “on an expedited basis.”32
Within seven months of its enactment, courts in all areas
of the country had decided cases about the legality under the Act
of local governments’ denying applications or refusing to act on
applications for the siting of cell phone towers.33 Telecom companies, eager to beat the competition for the provision of cell phone
service, were on one side of the litigation, while local governments,
Cybertelecom, supra note 3.
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996); 141 CONG. REC. H8269 (daily
ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Linder).
27 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (2012).
28 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I).
29 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).
30 Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions of Sec. 332(c)(7)(B), 24 F.C.C.
Rcd. 13994, 14012 (2009) (finding 90 days to be reasonable time to process
collocation applications and 150 days to be reasonable time to process other
applications).
31 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii), (iii).
32 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
33 See generally BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Gwinnett Cty., 944 F. Supp.
923 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Sprint Spectrum v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036
(W.D. Wash. 1996); Crown Commc’ns v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 679 A.2d 271
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996); Westel-Milwaukee Co. v. Walworth Cty., 556 N.W.2d
107 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
25
26
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pressured by constituents to keep cell phone towers away from
their properties, were on the other.34 Twenty years after passage
of the Act, the confrontational and litigious situation has changed
little with all sides sharing blame for that.35 Congress has not
amended the Act to clarify the ambiguous terms that are the
focus of lawsuits;36 the FCC has not issued sufficient rules that
would help local governments make legal decisions about tower
sitings;37 telecom companies have not paid enough attention to
the concerns of local residents;38 and local governments have not
taken some fairly obvious, and not necessarily expensive, actions
that would make them more successful in justifying to a court
their denial of applications to construct cell phone towers.39 Two
of the most frequently adjudicated issues are whether the governing body’s decision to deny an application to construct a cell
tower was based on substantial evidence,40 and whether the
telecom company is providing a cure for a significant gap in its
cell phone service without which it would effectively be prohibited
from supplying cell phone service.41
II. THE LITIGATION
A. Substantial Evidence
Courts have noted that the substantial evidence requirement “preserves the decision-making authority of local zoning
See generally BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 923; Sprint Spectrum,
924 F. Supp. at 1036; Crown Commc’ns, 679 A.2d at 271; Westel-Milwaukee,
556 N.W.2d at 107.
35 See, e.g., Meersman, supra note 4, at 438.
36 See Norton, supra note 3, at 2.
37 In 2009, the FCC issued a Declaratory Ruling that addressed some siting
issues, but, given the number of cases that have been litigated between then
and now, it was clearly not sufficient. FCC Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions of Section 332(c)(7)(B) to Ensure Timely Siting Review and to Preempt
under Section 253 State and Local Ordinances that Classify All Wireless Siting
Proposals as Requiring a Variance, 24 F.C.C. Rcd. 13994 (Nov. 18, 2009).
38 Susskind & Field, supra note 20.
39 See infra text accompanying note 255; see also Meersman, supra note 4,
at 438.
40 Indus. Tower & Wireless, LLC v. Haddad, 109 F. Supp. 3d 284, 296 (D.
Mass. 2015) (citing ATC Realty, LLC v. Town of Kingston, 303 F.3d 91, 94 (1st
Cir. 2002)).
41 Green Mountain Realty Corp. v. Leonard, 750 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2014).
34
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boards, ‘while protecting wireless service providers from unsupported decisions that stymie the expansion of telecommunication
technology.’”42 This is a worthy purpose; however, as a practical
matter, the requirement costs a great deal to taxpayers and cell
phone users in litigation costs because its meaning is so unclear
even after twenty years of adjudication.43 As recently as 2015,
the United States Supreme Court discussed the term “substantial evidence” as it was used by Congress in the Act.44 The Court
said that the phrase is a term of art requiring an administrative
agency to disclose clearly the reasons for its decisions so that a
reviewing court would be able to judge the decisions.45 The Court
stressed that the reasons do not have to “be elaborate or even
sophisticated,” just “clear enough to enable judicial review.”46
Those statements did not answer what kind of evidence is “substantial” and how much evidence is “substantial.” So the opinion
was not helpful in resolving an issue that is central to many
cases.47 Determining whether substantial evidence supports a
denial of a permit to construct telecom facilities remains a “factintensive inquiry.”48
1. Defining Substantial Evidence
Six months after the 1996 Act became law, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia decided
that the Gwinnett County Board of Commissioners violated the
“substantial evidence” requirement in the Act when the Board denied BellSouth’s application to erect a 197-foot monopole to improve
the quality of its cell phone service.49 The court reasoned that
Indus. Tower & Wireless, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 296 (citing ATC Realty, 303
F.3d at 94).
43 See generally Meersman, supra note 4.
44 T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2015).
45 Id.
46 Id. For a discussion of “reason-giving requirements,” see Donald J. Kochan,
Constituencies and Contemporaneousness in Reason-Giving: Thoughts and
Direction After T-Mobile, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2015).
47 T-Mobile S., 135 S. Ct. at 815.
48 T-Mobile N.E. LLC v. City Council of Newport News, Va., 674 F.3d 380,
388 (4th Cir. 2012).
49 BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Gwinnett Cty., 944 F. Supp. 923, 924, 928
(N.D. Ga. 1996); see also Jud. Prac. Comm. of the Fed. Comm’ns Bar Ass’n,
42
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substantial evidence means “‘more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’”50 BellSouth submitted “numerous” documents supporting its application including a report
by the Airspace Safety Analysis Corporation (ASAC) indicating
that the monopole presented no air space risk;51 a memorandum
from the Gwinnett County Airport Authority agreeing with the
ASAC;52 and supporting memoranda from the Gwinnett County
departments of transportation, public safety, and planning and
development.53 Gwinnett County residents of two subdivisions,
on the other hand, were represented by one resident who spoke
for the allotted five minutes at a County hearing.54 The resident
raised concerns about children’s safety, potential damage in storms,
aesthetic incompatibility with existing structures, and decreased
property values.55 The court concluded that it could not “conscientiously find that the evidence supporting the board’s decision
to deny plaintiffs’ a tall structure permit is substantial.”56
This twenty-year-old decision raised two issues. First,
nothing in the Act requires a balancing of evidence to determine
whose evidence is more substantial, merely that a denial of a request to construct a telecom facility is supported by substantial
evidence.57 In 2003, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Act
Communications Law: Annual Review: T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell,
Georgia No. 13-975 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2015), 67 FED. COMM. L.J. 377 (2015) (explaining the court’s decision).
50 BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 928 (citing Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1952)). “Substantial evidence” has also been defined as “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Michael
Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 762 (11th Cir. 2005).
51 BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 928.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 926.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 928.
57 It should be noted that in an entirely different context, the U.S. Supreme Court mentioned that its “phrasing ... readily lent itself to the notion”
that evidence supporting an administrative decision could be considered
“‘substantial’ when considered by itself,” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 477–78 (1951), however, the Court concluded that “[t]he substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly
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does not require a comparative test, but only that the denial of
an application to construct a tower is supported by substantial
evidence.58 A comparative approach would set a stricter standard
than the Act requires.59
Secondly, after giving a definition of “substantial evidence,” the Gwinnett court assumed, without discussion, that at
least four concerns raised by residents were not more than a
scintilla of evidence, and no reasonable mind could accept those
concerns as relevant evidence supporting the denial of the application to erect a monopole that would be visible from the front
windows of at least twenty residents.60 The implication is that
only reports by experts can be considered substantial evidence
and common concerns of residents are weightless.61 These issues
remained for several years, as the Gwinnett case became a model that courts all over the country followed.62 But not all courts
were persuaded that residents’ objections were not substantial.63
Two years later, the Fourth Circuit explained that a substantial
evidence standard created for administrative decisions should be
different from one meant for legislative decisions.64 It is appropriate that “a legislature and its members will consider the views
of their constituents to be particularly compelling forms of evidence, in zoning as in all other legislative matters … often
trump[ing] those of bureaucrats or experts.”65 In 1999, the United
detracts from its weight.” Id. at 488. There is nothing in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that requires a denial of an application to construct a cell
phone tower to be supported by an entire record of evidence, only by “substantial evidence.” The interpretation of those words is problematic. See, e.g.,
J.I.B. Constitutional Substantial-Evidence Review? Lessons from the Supreme
Court’s Turner Broadcasting Decisions, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1162 (1997) (concluding that Court’s approach to constitutional substantial-evidence is “vague
and confused”).
58 USCOC of Va. RSA #3, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 343
F.3d 262, 270 (4th Cir. 2003).
59 Id.
60 BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 926.
61 Id.
62 See, e.g., Ill. RSA No. 3, Inc. v. Cty. of Peoria, 963 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Ill.
1997); W. PCS II Corp. v. Extraterritorial Zoning Auth., 957 F. Supp. 1230
(D. N.M. 1997).
63 AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council, 155 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 1998).
64 Id.
65 Id.
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit opined that when
courts evaluate a tower permit denial under the Act, they must
view the record in its entirety, including evidence that does not
support the local government’s decision.66 The court noted that,
in New York, aesthetics can be a valid ground for local zoning
decisions, but that under the Act, there must be “more tha[n] a
mere scintilla” of evidence of the negative visual impact of the
tower to be considered substantial evidence that serves as the
basis for a permit denial.67 The court held that the more-than-ascintilla standard was not satisfied by a few generalized expressions of concern with aesthetics.68 Similarly, the court concluded
that residents’ generalized expressions of fear of declining property values also did not meet the substantial evidence standard
to support a denial of a tower permit.69 The court recognized the
difficulty in evaluating the substantiality of residents’ concerns
about aesthetics and property values when they are opposed by
expert testimony provided by telecommunications companies; however, in this case, the evaluation was complicated by the residents’ emphasis on health concerns, an argument that the Act
does not permit as a basis for denying a permit.70 Residents and
the local Town of Oyster Bay government, being lay people, obviously did not recognize that they were undermining their own
position by emphasizing their fears that a cell phone tower poses
health risks.71 Perhaps the court might have been persuaded by
Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 495.
68 Id. at 496.
69 Id.
70 Id. The Act prohibits the denial of a permit to erect a telecommunications facility on the basis of health or environmental concerns if the facility
meets FCC standards. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (2012).
71 Twenty years after the Act’s passage, laypeople, and often their elected
representatives, continue to undermine their legal position in denying applications to construct cell phone towers, by emphasizing that their objections are
primarily based on fears of health risks. See, e.g., Deon J. Hampton, Ronkonkoma
T-Mobile Cell Tower to Be Built Despite Concerns, NEWSDAY (Long Island, NY),
Jan. 17, 2016, http://www.newsday.com/long-island/Suffolk/ronkonkoma-t-mo
bile-cell-tower-to-be-built-despite-concerns-1.11333828 [https://perma.cc/YGL7
-SDVM] (reporting that residents near site fear tower will affect health); WeHo
Planning Commission Rejects Verizon Wireless Request to Install Cell Antenna, ICT MONITOR WORLDWIDE, Dec. 4, 2015, at 2015 WLNR 35955535
(West Hollywood, CA).
66
67
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arguments about aesthetics and property values had they not
seemed secondary to impermissible health arguments.72
In 2002, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the Act does not
define “substantial evidence,” and, therefore, Congress must have
meant the phrase to have its usual “scintilla/reasonable minds”
definition.73 The court went on to say that aesthetic concerns
could be the basis for the denial of a tower permit, but there had
to be substantial evidence, and in the case before the court, there
was no substantial evidence.74 County residents undermined their
position by presenting petitions that contained no reasons why
petitioners signed, and no evidence of the visual impact of the
tower.75 This case is another example of residents and local government not understanding how to mount a case under the Act.76
On the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, deciding a case about an eighty-five-foot
tower in Des Moines, Iowa, concluded that the denial of the exception and variance needed for the construction was based on
substantial evidence, even though there was no expert testimony.77
The substantial evidence consisted of residents’ testimony that ice
could form on the tower and damage cars in the parking lot below;78 the tower would be seen from the windows on one side of the
building, diminishing residents’ enjoyment of their property;79
and the proximity of the tower would lower their property values.80
The court said that it was common sense that ice would form on
cell towers in Des Moines in the winter, that owners’ complaints
about not enjoying their property if their views were of the tower
were not merely “nebulous aesthetic concerns,” and that the view
would reduce property values.81 The First Circuit also concluded
that because local zoning boards are made up of lay citizens,
Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 495–96 (2d Cir. 1999).
Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup Cty., 296 F.3d 1210, 1218 (11th Cir. 2002).
74 Id. at 1219–20.
75 Id. at 1219.
76 Id. at 1222.
77 USCOC of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Zoning Bd., 465 F.3d 817, 823 (8th Cir.
2006).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
72
73
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they do not have to make extensive factual findings to support a
decision to deny an application to construct a cell phone tower.82
The foregoing opinions suggest that litigation outcomes are currently so fact and court sensitive that it is important to create articulated standards that can be replicated and met in cases across
the country.83
By 2011, local residents in some locations had become
more sophisticated in presenting their cases against a tower
siting.84 The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida affirmed Manatee County’s denial of a permit to build
a 150-foot tower within a residential golf course community.85
The court cited the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion that aesthetic concerns could be the basis for a permit denial.86 In addition to residents’ testimony at a hearing, they presented slide shows, maps,
graphs, a photo simulation, and a video presentation.87 Residents
also presented academic articles about a tower’s negative impact
on property values, and a financial planner and two realtors
testified about that.88 The court concluded that this record constituted substantial evidence on which to base a permit denial.89
2. Aesthetics
Often, over the years, a court’s affirmation of a local government’s denial of a permit to construct a cell tower depended
on whether the government’s decision was based on substantial
evidence of specific aesthetic problems that would be created by
the tower.90 However, even with twenty years of experience,
what that means is still unclear.91 In 2016, the United States
Second Generation Props., LP v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 629 (1st
Cir. 2002).
83 See id. at 635.
84 See, e.g., Vertex Dev., LLC v. Manatee Cty., 761 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (M.D.
Fla. 2011).
85 Id. at 1371.
86 Id. at 1362.
87 Id. at 1361.
88 Id. at 1366–67.
89 Id. at 1370–71.
90 Cellular S. Real Estate, Inc. v. City of Mobile, No. 15-00387-CG-B, 2016
WL 3746661, at *7 (S.D. Ala. July 8, 2016).
91 Id.
82
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District Court for the Southern District of Alabama undertook a
review of all district court cases within the Eleventh Circuit
about towers and aesthetics and concluded that there is very
little consistency and “no bright line rule to determine whether a
given amount of aesthetic evidence is enough to support a finding of substantial evidence.”92 Nevertheless, two Eleventh Circuit
tower siting cases, decided in 2002 within two weeks of each
other, suggest the kinds of facts that will predispose a court to
decide in favor of either the telecom company or the local government denying the tower permit.93
In Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County,94 the telecom
company applied to construct a 250-foot tower.95 At a hearing on
the application, the county zoning administrator submitted an
affidavit stating that several local residents told him they opposed the tower presumably because it was visually obtrusive, but
there were no specific objections.96 Five petitions opposing the
tower were submitted, but some of them were missing information
and none contained any specific objections.97 Immediately after the
hearing, the county board voted to deny the construction application.98 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that aesthetic values were a legitimate local concern,99 but affirmed the district
court’s order to the county to approve the tower application100
because “citizens’ generalized concerns about aesthetics are insufficient to constitute substantial evidence upon which the [b]oard
could rely.”101
Just two weeks earlier in American Tower Ltd. Partnership
v. City of Huntsville,102 the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
Id.
Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup Cty., 296 F.3d 1210, 1219–20 (11th Cir. 2002);
Am. Tower LP v. City of Huntsville, 295 F.3d 1203, 1208–09 (11th Cir. 2002).
94 Preferred Sites, 296 F.3d at 1212.
95 Id. at 1213.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1214.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1222.
101 Id. at 1219.
102 Am. Tower LP v. City of Huntsville, 295 F.3d 1203, 1204 (11th Cir. 2002).
92
93
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court and decided in favor of the local zoning board, holding that
the board’s decision to deny the application to construct a cell
tower was supported by substantial evidence.103 In this case, the
board heard testimony from a local realtor who said that once
people in the neighborhood knew about the proposed tower, it
became harder to sell neighborhood houses, devaluing homes
and harming the area.104 She testified that she lost potential
buyers for her own property because of the tower.105 The board
also heard testimony from other residents about the tower’s
negative aesthetic impact and its unusual proximity to schools
and soccer fields.106 The facts of these two cases are not dramatically different, but the cases indicate the importance of evidence
that particularizes the negative aesthetic impact of a cell tower
in order to be considered substantial and, therefore, sufficient to
support a denial of permission to construct a tower.107
In T-Mobile USA Inc. v. City of Anacortes,108 T-Mobile applied to the City of Anacortes for a special permit to erect a 116-foot
monopole for cell phone service.109 Some residents claimed that
because the monopole would not be fully screened, it would have
a negative effect on the neighborhood and their views.110 The
city denied the application on that basis.111 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that the denial was based on “more than a scintilla of
evidence” and, therefore, constituted substantial evidence sufficient to support the denial under the Act.112 A significant factor
was that the Anacortes Municipal Code provided that the problems mentioned by the residents were issues that could be considered in decisions about special use permits.113
Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1208.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1208–09.
107 Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup Cty., 296 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th Cir.
2002); Am. Tower, 295 F.3d at 1208.
108 T-Mobile USA Inc. v. City of Anacortes, 572 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2009).
109 Id. at 988.
110 Id. at 994–95.
111 Id. at 989–90.
112 Id. at 995.
113 Id. at 994.
103
104
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3. Relevance of Local Zoning Codes
One of the more important criteria that has developed for
determining whether the substantial evidence standard has been
met when a local government denies a tower siting permit, is the
local government’s consideration of the requirements of local zoning
ordinances.114 The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits115 have acknowledged that the Act “itself
does not provide the legal basis to deny an application to construct a personal wireless facility. That authority must be found
in state or local law.”116 The Fourth Circuit consistently held
that the failure to comply with local zoning regulations is a significant factor justifying the denial of an application for a cell
phone tower,117 and under some circumstances may even be sufficient by itself.118
The Eighth Circuit has said that the Act has not displaced local zoning law when it comes to cell towers because the Act does not
contain any substantive law about granting or denying permits for
cell towers.119 Thus, substantial evidence of aesthetic harmony120 or
the views in a public park,121 as well as goals contained in local
PI Telecom Infrastructure, LLC v. City of Jacksonville, 104 F. Supp. 3d
1321, 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (citing federal district court decisions from 2009
and 2010); Vertex Dev., LLC v. Manatee Cty., 761 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1364
(M.D. Fla. 2011) (noting the Act permits local government to apply standards
in local zoning codes).
115 Sprint Spectrum, LP v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the Borough of
Paramus N.J., 606 F. Appx. 669, 672 (3d Cir. 2015); T-Mobile Cent. LLC v.
Charter Twp. of W. Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794, 798–99 (6th Cir. 2012); T-Mobile
N.E. LLC v. City Council of Newport News, 674 F.3d 380, 387 (4th Cir. 2012);
MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 400 F.3d 715, 723–24 (9th
Cir. 2005); Voicestream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix Cty., 342 F.3d 818, 830
(7th Cir. 2003); S.W. Bell Mobile Sys. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 57 (1st Cir. 2001);
Sprint Spectrum LP v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 644 (2d Cir. 1999).
116 Willoth, 176 F.3d at 644.
117 USCOC of Va. RSA #3, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 343
F.3d 262, 271 (4th Cir. 2003); 360 degrees Commc’ns Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 211 F.3d 79, 84 (4th Cir. 2000).
118 USCOC of Va. RSA #3, 343 F.3d at 271.
119 USCOC of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 465 F.3d
817, 822 (8th Cir. 2006).
120 Vertex Dev., LLC v. Manatee Cty., 761 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1365 (M.D.
Fla. 2011).
121 PI Telecom Infrastructure, LLC v. City of Jacksonville, 104 F. Supp. 3d
1321, 1344 (M.D. Fla. 2015).
114
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zoning codes, can be grounds for denying a variance for a cell
tower.122 In cases in which those two issues were grounds for the
denial of variances to erect cell phone towers, the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida accepted as substantial evidence combinations of academic articles, photographs,
and testimony by real estate professionals.123
The San Francisco Planning Code says that the city may
take into consideration “community need” in deciding whether
or not to approve applications for conditional uses which include
cell phone facilities.124 When a telecom company applied for a
permit to erect six antennas fifty-three feet above the sidewalk
in the Richmond neighborhood, the City Zoning Board denied
the application on the grounds that the Richmond neighborhood
did not need additional telecom facilities.125 The Ninth Circuit
concluded the Board’s denial was supported by substantial evidence because even the applicant’s representatives testified that five
other telecom providers had antennas in the same neighborhood
providing excellent coverage.126 In addition, local residents provided testimony, petitions, and site maps, all indicating excellent
wireless coverage.127
The Sixth Circuit also looked at the local zoning code in
Saginaw, Michigan, to determine whether the Saginaw Zoning
Board supported with substantial evidence its denial of a variance for a telecom company to construct a 150-foot cell tower.128
The court dismissed all three reasons for the denial: the aesthetics concern was based on merely a few mentions and no discussion at meetings;129 the health concern was not permitted by the
Act;130 and offering an alternative construction site was not based
on any criteria in the Zoning Code for granting a variance.131
The court concluded that a denial of a variance cannot be based
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1350; Vertex, 761 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
124 MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 400 F.3d 715, 725 (9th
Cir. 2005).
125 Id. at 718, 725.
126 Id. at 726.
127 Id.
128 New Par v. City of Saginaw, 301 F.3d 390, 392, 396 (6th Cir. 2002).
129 Id. at 398.
130 Id.
131 Id.
122
123
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on substantial evidence if the grounds for the denial are not related to criteria in the zoning code.132
About twenty years after the Act became law, cases about
denials of variances for towers still exist but local governments
and local residents have become more sophisticated in presenting evidence that courts may consider substantial, particularly
by connecting their objections to local zoning codes.133 For example, in 2015, the Quorum Court of Washington County, Arkansas, denied an application for construction of a 300-foot cell
phone tower on property zoned agricultural.134 Residents in surrounding neighborhoods, using pictures and simulations, objected
to the tower on the bases of safety issues in the event of tornadoes and other weather incidents and the impact on residents’
views and property values, relating their objections to a specific
section in the Washington County Zoning Code.135 The Eighth
Circuit agreed that the application denial was supported by substantial evidence.136
In 2016, the United States District Court for the District
of Kansas held that the Bel Aire City Council’s denial of a permit to construct a 170-foot cell tower was supported by substantial evidence.137 The court noted that the Council’s reasons for
the denial were “clearly proper considerations” based on the city
code and several city zoning regulations. 138 The court also noted
that the proposed “galvanized tower” would be five times the
height of the homes in the residential neighborhood in which it
would be located,139 and that the Act does not require a city
council “to cast aside its common sense.”140
See id.
See infra text accompanying notes 134–40.
134 Smith Commc’ns, LLC v. Washington Cty., 785 F.3d 1253, 1256, 1259
(8th Cir. 2015).
135 Id. at 1255–56, 1259. The Eighth Circuit noted in its opinion that a
member of the Quorum Court stated he “would not buy property in the area
with the 300-foot tower so close.” Id. at 1259.
136 Id. at 1259–60.
137 See Stout & Co. v. City of Bel Aire, No. 2:15-CV-09323-JTM, 2016 WL
3759440, at *1 (D. Kan. July 14, 2016).
138 See id. at *9.
139 See id.
140 Id.
132
133
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4. Substantial Evidence in New Jersey

The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division has
noted that the “substantial evidence” requirement is similar in both
the Act and New Jersey’s Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL).141
The court had a case in 2016 involving an application to erect a
cell tower designed as a 120-foot flagpole.142 The application required the granting of a variance, and under New Jersey law, the
applicant must provide proof of positive criteria, that is, “special
reasons” for the variance, and negative criteria, that is, “the variance ‘can be granted without substantial detriment to the public
good and that it will not substantially impair the intent and the
purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.”143 The court then
applied the “Sica balancing test” which the New Jersey Supreme
Court fashioned for a variance case it decided before the Act became law and which had nothing to do with telecom facilities.144
Although New Jersey law did not explicitly require a balancing
test, the Sica court noted that
[J]ust because an institution [or facility] is thought to be a
good thing for the community is no reason to exempt it completely from restrictions designed to alleviate any baneful physical impact it may nonetheless exert in the interest of another
aspect of the public good equally worthy of protection. 145

The Sica court then provided a general guide for balancing positive
and negative criteria when deciding whether to grant a variance.146
First, the local agency should identify the public interest and
decide how compelling the proposed use is in satisfying the public
interest.147 Second, the local agency should identify the detrimental
See T-Mobile N.E., LLC v. Borough of Mendham Zoning Bd., No. L-271910, 2015 WL 10091529, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 16, 2016).
142 Id.
143 Id. at *2 (citing Sica v. Bd. of Adjustment, 603 A.2d 30 (N.J. 1992).
144 See id. at *2–3, *7–10. The Sica case concerned the denial of a variance
application for the construction of a residential facility for rehabilitation of
head trauma victims in a residential zone. Sica, 603 A.2d at 32–33.
145 Sica, 603 A.2d at 35 (quoting the concurring opinion in Roman Catholic
Diocese v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 220 A.2d 97, 102–03 (N.J. 1966)).
146 Id. at 37.
147 Id.
141
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effect of granting the variance, recognizing that a minimal detrimental effect may not outweigh a beneficial use.148 Third, the
local agency may reduce the impact of the detrimental effect by
requiring conditions be met before the variance is granted.149
And fourth, the local agency should balance the positive and
negative criteria and decide whether granting the variance would
be substantially detrimental to the public good.150
The 2016 New Jersey appellate court stated that when doing a Sica balancing test, the positive criteria are satisfied if an
FCC-licensed carrier provides credible testimony that there is a
gap in cell phone coverage.151 Then the court addressed the negative criteria: first, the local agency has to decide whether granting the variance would “cause such damage to the character of
the neighborhood as to constitute ‘substantial detriment to the
public good;’”152 and second, the local agency must have proof
that the proposed use would not “‘substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.’”153
After setting up these very specific criteria, the court analyzed the local zoning board’s denial of T-Mobile Northeast’s
application to erect a 120-foot monopole in a shopping center.154
The court noted the similarity between New Jersey’s municipal
law and the federal Act in requiring zoning boards to base their
decisions on “‘substantiated proofs rather than unsupported allegations.’”155 The New Jersey appellate court concluded that TMobile satisfied the positive criteria, and, because there were no
findings on the impact of the monopole on adjacent properties or
the impairment of the zone plan or ordinance, and T-Mobile also
satisfied the negative criteria, the application for a variance
should be granted.156
Id.
Id.
150 Id.
151 See T-Mobile N.E., LLC v. Borough of Mendham Zoning Bd., No. L2719-10, 2015 WL 10091529, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 16, 2016).
152 Id.
153 Id. at *4 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D–70(d)).
154 Id. at *8–11.
155 Id. at *8 (quoting Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment of W.
Windsor Twp., 796 A.2d 247, 255 (N.J. 2002)).
156 Id. at *11.
148
149
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The New Jersey court’s detailed approach with specific
steps for deciding whether to grant a variance for a telecom facility appears much more standardized than basing a decision on
whether it was supported by substantial evidence.157 The ultimate
conclusion, however, relies on the same assessment about the
amount and quality of the evidence presented on each side of the
controversy.158 The New Jersey court, while talking about positive and negative criteria, ultimately noted that a local agency
cannot base a denial of a variance on only unsupported resident
testimony when there is no qualified expert testimony.159
5. Substantial Evidence in New York
Because New York law provides that telecom providers
are public utilities for the purpose of zoning applications, applications to erect telecom facilities are reviewed under an easier
“public necessity” standard.160 For telecom providers, that standard means that the applicant for a zoning permit must show
that there are gaps in cell phone service, the proposed facility
will eliminate the gaps, and the proposed facility will intrude only
minimally on the community.161 Because of the advantage given
to public utilities, the assumption is that no substantial evidence
exists to support a denial of the permit if the telecom provider
demonstrates those three factors.162 If the absence of just one of
those factors is supported by substantial evidence, then a court
will not overrule a permit denial by the local government.163
Negatively affecting the aesthetics of an area can be grounds
for denying a zoning application in New York.164 Generalized or
speculative negative effects will not constitute substantial evidence supporting a denial; instead, there must be objective evidence
See id. at *2–4.
See id. at *11.
159 Id.
160 T-Mobile N.E., LLC v. Town of Islip, 893 F. Supp. 2d 338, 355
(E.D.N.Y. 2012).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 356 (citing Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490,
495 (2d Cir. 1999); Suffolk Outdoor Advert. v. Hulse, 373 N.E.2d 263, 265
(N.Y. 1977)).
157
158
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in the form of photographs, site plans, surveys, or something
similar to indicate that residents will be able to see the proposed
facility and that “there will be an actual ‘negative visual impact
on the community.’”165 It is also important that the local Zoning
Code indicates the locality’s commitment to protecting residential districts when making decisions about the location of telecom facilities.166 The Second Circuit, in deciding a case about
siting telecom towers in New York, noted the importance of the
Act’s not requiring local governments to approve all telecom
permit applications: denials are incentives for providers to create new technology that improves reception and minimizes towers, satisfying the Act’s goal of encouraging innovation.167
B. Significant Gap
Even if a local government’s denial of an application to
erect a telecom facility is supported by substantial evidence, the
denial will violate the Act if it prevents closure of significant
gaps in cell phone service.168 Preventing closure of gaps is violative of the Act’s requirement that local governments “not prohibit
or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.”169 The problem with this formulation is there is no
general rule about what constitutes a significant gap or what is
an effective prohibition.170 Each litigated dispute is accordingly
resolved based on its specific facts and circumstances.171
165 T-Mobile N.E., 893 F. Supp. 2d at 358 (quoting Cellular Telephone Co.
v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1999)).
166 See id. at 362.
167 Sprint Spectrum, LP v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 640 (2d Cir. 1999).
168 Green Mountain Realty Corp. v. Leonard, 750 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2014).
169 Id. (quoting Nat’l Tower, LLC v. Plainville Zoning Bd., 297 F.3d 14, 19
(1st Cir. 2002)) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II)). For a discussion of the
Act’s effective prohibition rule, see, e.g., Andrew Erber, Note, The Effective
Prohibition Preemption in Modern Wireless Tower Siting, 66 FED. COMM. L.J.
357 (2014); Lucas R. White, Note, Untangling the Circuit Splits Regarding
Cell Tower Siting Policy and 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7): When Is a Denial of One
Effectively a Prohibition on All?, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1981 (2013).
170 Green Mountain, 750 F.3d at 40.
171 Id. (citing Second Generation Props., LP v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d
620, 630 (1st Cir. 2002)). For a discussion of the early foundational cases on
“significant gap,” see generally Stephanie E. Niehaus, Note, Bridging the
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The Third Circuit created a two-prong test for deciding
whether an effective prohibition exists.172 The telecom provider
must demonstrate that, first, remote users have a significant gap
in cell phone service and are not served by another provider; and,
second, the gap will be filled in the least intrusive manner.173
Clearly, this test does not explain what specific facts will constitute a significant gap. The Second Circuit attempted more specificity: if the cell phone service gaps are very limited, such as
inside buildings in a low population rural area or limited to few
houses, then the “lack of coverage likely will be de minimis” and
not be a significant gap that is the equivalent of prohibiting service.174 The Tenth Circuit, in evaluating facts presented to show
a significant gap, determined that a lack of reliable in-building
or in-vehicle service and a gap in service along major highways
would constitute significant gaps whereas “isolated ‘dead spots’”
in “‘a small residential cul-de-sac,’” or in-building service “‘in a
sparsely populated rural area,’” would not.175 Other courts deciding whether there was a significant gap have wanted to know
whether cell phone service was “sufficiently poor” and whether
the number of affected users was sufficiently large.176 One city
has argued that denial of a permit for facilities to improve inbuilding cell phone service in an area that already has service is
not equivalent to prohibiting wireless service, but the court was
not persuaded because the area of weak or no service extended
over several blocks.177 The First Circuit had, perhaps, the longest
(Significant) Gap: To What Extent Does the Telecommunications Act of 1996
Contemplate Seamless Service?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 641 (2002).
172 APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P’ship v. Penn Twp., 196 F.3d 469, 480 (3d Cir.
1999); see also Nextel W. Corp. v. Unity Twp., 282 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir.
2002) (then–Circuit Judge Alito confirming two-prong test).
173 APT Pittsburgh, 196 F.3d at 480.
174 Sprint Spectrum, LP v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643–44 (2d Cir. 1999).
175 AT&T Mobility Serv., LLC v. Vill. of Corrales, No. 15-2069, 2016 WL
873398, at *3 (10th Cir. Mar. 8, 2016) (quoting Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643; Cellular Tel. Co. v. Zoning Bd., 197 F.3d 64, 70 n.2 (3d Cir.1999)).
176 Liberty Towers, LLC v. Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 10-1666, 2011 WL
3496044, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2011) (quoting New Cingular Wireless PCS,
LLC v. Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 06-2932, 2009 WL 3127756, at *7 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 29, 2009)); New Cingular Wireless PCS, 2009 WL 3127756, at *7 (quoting Am. Cellular Network Co. v. Upper Dublin Twp., 203 F. Supp. 2d 383,
389 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).
177 PI Telecom Infrastructure, LLC v. City of Jacksonville, 104 F. Supp. 3d
1321, 1347–48 (M.D. Fla. 2015).
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list of factors to consider in deciding whether a gap was significant: the physical size of the gap, the kind of area in which the
gap was located, the number of users affected, whether all the
provider’s users in the gap area were affected, and the percent of
calls that were not connected or were dropped.178 Nevertheless,
it is left to local governments and courts to determine the size of
the gap, the number of users affected, or the percent of unsuccessful calls that constitutes a significant gap.179
The question of whose perspective should a significant
gap be considered is a more specific issue. Telecom providers have
argued that the proper inquiry is whether a particular provider
has significant gaps in its cell phone service, whereas local governments have argued that no significant gap exists if residents
have adequate access through other providers.180 Through the first
ten years after the Act’s passage, different courts took different
positions on this issue.181 In 2009, the FCC answered the question
by issuing a declaratory ruling that the Act’s prohibits-or-has-theeffect-of-prohibiting-the-provision-of-personal-wireless-services regulation is violated when a local government denies an application
to construct telecom facilities on the grounds that other providers
See Omnipoint Holdings, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 586 F.3d 38, 49–50
(1st Cir. 2009).
179 See, e.g., Liberty Towers, LLC v. Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 10-7149,
2011 WL 6091081, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2011) (stating that “[t]here are no
magic numbers or percentages that constitute a significant gap. Neither the
TCA, the FCC, nor the courts have established the ‘significant gap’ threshold.
Hence, each case must be viewed on its own”).
180 See, e.g., Liberty Towers, LLC v. Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 10-1666, 2011
WL 3496044, at *8–9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2011).
181See, e.g., Sprint Spectrum, LP v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643 (2d Cir.
1999) (finding that “once an area is sufficiently serviced by a wireless service
provider, the right to deny applications becomes broader ….”); APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P’ship v. Penn Twp., 196 F.3d 469, 480 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding
that denial of a cell tower permit is effective prohibition only if there is no cell
phone service from any provider); AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of
Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 428–29 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that only a blanket
ban on telecom facilities is effective prohibition); Second Generation Prop.,
LP v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 633–34 (1st Cir. 2002) (identifying as a
significant gap in service if provider in question is prevented from filling
significant gap in its own service network); MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cty. of
S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 732 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting one-provider approach and
adopting the reasoning in Second Generation Props., 313 F.3d at 633).
178
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are already providing service in the same area.182 Since then, some
courts have concluded that because a goal of the Act is to promote competition, a gap must be evaluated from the provider’s
position.183 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, citing the First Circuit, concluded that an
any-service-equals-no-effective-prohibition rule would not make
sense because it would not help the user of AT&T Wireless, for
example, who does not have service if a gap is filled by Verizon
or Sprint.184 The Sixth Circuit, in a case of first impression, considered the FCC ruling and the varied approaches of five other
circuit courts and adopted the standards of the FCC and the
First and Ninth Circuits, namely that the significant gap refers
to a gap in the individual telecom applicant’s service.185 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
declared the FCC ruling to be determinative on the issue of a significant gap’s being assessed based on an individual provider’s
coverage without consideration of whether other carriers provide
service in the gap.186
Nevertheless, three years after the FCC ruling, the
Fourth Circuit was still interpreting the Act’s “effective prohibition” language as meaning one of only three actions: “a ‘blanket
ban’ on wireless service,” “a general policy that essentially guarantees rejection of all wireless facility applications,” or “the denial of an application for one particular site is ‘tantamount’ to a
general prohibition of service.”187 This definition of the Act’s
In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions of Section
332(c)(7)(B) to Ensure Timely Siting Review and to Preempt under Section
253 State and Local Ordinances that Classify All Wireless Siting Proposals as
Requiring a Variance, 24 F.C.C. Rcd. 13994, 14015–16 (Nov. 18, 2009).
183 See, e.g., Omnipoint Holdings, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 586 F.3d 38, 49,
51 (1st Cir. 2009) (concluding that significant gap means within individual
carrier’s system because the Act’s goal is to encourage competition); MetroPCS
N.Y., LLC v. Vill. of E. Hills, 764 F. Supp. 2d 441, 455 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (without
citing the 2009 FCC Ruling).
184 T-Mobile N.E., LLC v. Town of Ramapo, 701 F. Supp. 2d 446, 458
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Second Generation Props., 313 F.3d at 633).
185 T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Charter Twp., 691 F.3d 794, 807 (6th Cir. 2012).
186 T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. City of Fraser, 675 F. Supp. 2d 721, 729 (E.D.
Mich. 2009).
187 T-Mobile N.E., LLC v. Fairfax Cty. Bd. Of Supervisors, 672 F.3d 259,
266 (4th Cir. 2012). The Fourth Circuit has been consistent in taking a “user”
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prohibition is clearly looking at the prohibition from the position
of the user rather than the provider.188
In 1999, the Third Circuit adopted a user rule, considering a gap significant only if an area is not served by any cell
phone provider.189 The court confirmed its adoption of the user
rule in 2002.190 After the 2009 FCC ruling, district courts in the
Third Circuit were left with a predicament as to whether they
should be following the Third Circuit’s user rule or the FCC provider rule. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania has noted an issue of whether deference
should be given to the FCC ruling, but found it unnecessary to
discuss the issue because of the facts of its case.191 On the other
hand, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania acknowledged the split between the Third Circuit
and the FCC and decided that “under well-established principles
of administrative law, the FCC’s Declaratory Ruling is entitled to
deference from the federal courts.”192 Similarly, the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey acknowledged the
Third Circuit’s user rule, recognized that other circuits rejected
the user rule, and concluded that it had to follow the FCC’s provider rule interpretation of the Act.193
approach. In 1998, it held that in order to preserve local authority, the Act
should be interpreted as prohibiting only a blanket ban on cell phone facilities. AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council, 155 F.3d 423, 428–29 (4th Cir.
1998). In 2003, the court recognized that without a blanket ban, the denial of a
permit could theoretically be an effective prohibition of service if the location
in the application was the only one that would provide the required coverage.
USCOC of Va. RSA #3, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 343 F.3d
262, 268 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing 360 degrees Commc’ns Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 211 F.3d 79, 86 (4th Cir. 2000)). But the court thought that “scenario
‘seems unlikely in the real world.’” Id. (quoting 360 degrees Commc’ns, 211
F.3d at 86).
188 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
189 APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P’ship v. Penn Twp., 196 F.3d 469, 480 (3d Cir. 1999).
190 See Nextel W. Corp. v. Unity Twp., 282 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2002).
191 Nextel Commc’ns of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
No. 3:14-CV-2409, 2016 WL 1271385, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016).
192 Liberty Towers, LLC v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 748 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444
(E.D. Pa. 2010).
193 Sprint Spectrum LP v. Zoning Bd., No. 09-4940 (JLL), 2010 WL 4868218,
at *9 (D.N.J. 2010).
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Unfortunately, with more than twenty years of experience
under the Act, some courts are still concluding that “‘[s]ignificant
gap determinations are extremely fact-specific inquiries that defy
any bright-line legal rule.’”194 Given that problem, courts are
sometimes aided by scientific tools that can clarify factual questions. Two tools that the telecom industry uses to demonstrate the
inadequacy of existing signals are radio frequency propagation
maps and drive tests.195 Propagation maps are computer models
that predict signal strength within a geographic area covered by
the proposed cell tower.196 Drive tests are empirical studies conducted by driving a vehicle outfitted with sensitive radio frequency scanning and global positioning equipment that records
actual signal strength in an area.197 These tools, which are widely
used by the industry, help telecom companies make the case
there is a significant gap in cell phone service. Recently, even a
local zoning hearing board in Pennsylvania used a propagation
study to support its denial of a tower siting permit when there
were alternate sites more to the residents’ liking.198 Furthermore,
the board successfully argued that the telecom company’s propagation study was inconsistent with its drive test results and, therefore, it was unreliable, thus creating the substantial evidence
the board needed to support its permit denial.199
C. Recent Cases
With over twenty years of litigation deciding “substantial
evidence” and “significant gap” questions, one might think that
courts or Congress or the FCC would have supplied the answers
so local governments could avoid lawsuits when they deny a
permit for a cell phone tower, but that is obviously not the case.200
Stout & Co. v. City of Bel Aire, No. 2:15-CV-09323-JTM, 2016 WL
3759440, at *11 (D. Kan. July 14, 2016) (quoting T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Unified
Gov’t, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1165 (D. Kan. 2007); see AT&T Mobility Serv., LLC
v. Vill. of Corrales, No. 15-2069, 2016 WL 873398, at *2 (10th Cir. Mar. 8, 2016).
195 Vill. of Corrales, 2016 WL 873398, at *5 n.3.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 See, e.g., Nextel Commc’ns of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing
Bd., No. 3:14-CV-2409, 2016 WL 1271385, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016).
199 Id. at *6.
200 See supra Sections II.A–B.
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In the twentieth year and going forward after the Act’s passage,
the litigation continues.201 In many of the cases, the outcome
seems predictable and litigation avoidable.
The majority of recent cases have been decided in favor of
the telecom companies.202 For example, in Orange County—
County of Poughkeepsie Ltd. Partnership v. Town of East Fishkill,203 the Second Circuit held that the town’s denial of Verizon’s
application to construct a 150-foot monopole204 was an effective
prohibition of wireless services in violation of the Act.205 Verizon
claimed it needed the monopole to close a significant gap in cell
phone service.206 The court said deciding whether a gap is significant “is a ‘fact-bound’ question that requires a case-by-case determination.”207 The court concluded that evidence showed that
the gap affected about 35,000 people every day—a significant
gap.208 Verizon investigated alternate sites and concluded that
none would remedy the existing gap.209 It took four years from
the time Verizon submitted its application for the permit210 until
the Second Circuit rendered its verdict.211 It would seem that if
Verizon had spent time and resources in good faith, before even
applying for a permit, to explain the legal and technical facts to
the town and its residents, litigation might have been avoided,
serving the interests of all parties.
In Vantage Tower Group, LLC v. Chatham County—
Savannah Metropolitan Planning Commission,212 Vantage submitted an application for a variance to build a 127-foot cell tower
See supra Sections II.A–B.
Hanlong Fu, The Impact of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in the
Broadband Age, 9 ADVANCES COMM. & MEDIA RESEARCH 117, 132 (2015) (discussing the dampening effect the Act had on competition amongst telecom companies).
203 Orange Cty.—Cty. of Poughkeepsie Ltd. P’ship v. Town of E. Fishkill,
632 Fed. Appx. *1 (2d Cir. 2015).
204 Orange Cty.—Cty. of Poughkeepsie Ltd. P’ship v. Town of E. Fishkill,
84 F. Supp. 3d 274, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
205 Orange Cty., 632 Fed. Appx. at *4.
206 Id. at *2.
207 Id. (citing Omnipoint Holdings, 586 F.3d at 48).
208 Id. at *3.
209 Id.
210 Orange Cty., 84 F. Supp. 3d at 279 (application submitted on Nov. 28, 2011).
211 Orange Cty., 632 Fed. Appx. at *1.
212 Vantage Tower Group, LLC v. Chatham Cty.—Savannah Metro. Planning Comm’n, No. 4:13-CV-258, 2015 WL 300257 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2015).
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where the City of Savannah prohibits towers taller than eightyfive feet.213 The city council denied the request for the variance
in a letter that did not give any reasons for the decision.214 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
held that the city violated the Act by not providing any reasons
for its decision.215 The Act does not provide a remedy when its
provisions have been violated, but in most similar cases, courts
have ordered the government to approve the permit.216 This court
decided that the city acted in good faith and so remanded Vantage’s request back to the city “hop[ing]” that this time the city
would give “a list of detailed reasons” for its decision.217 This situation is a great waste of resources for the telecom company, the
city, the court, and ultimately ratepayers and taxpayers. Delay is a
strategy but, in the case of cell towers, it does not serve the public interest. The city should have done it correctly the first time.
NE Colorado Cellular, Inc. v. City of North Platte218 is another case that makes one wonder about the legal advice the city
was getting or if its officials were just acting to win favor among
their residents who are their voters. Viaero Wireless applied for
a permit to erect a 100-foot cell tower.219 The city denied the
permit on the grounds that the tower would not be in compliance
with the city code because it “was not ‘in harmony with the
character of the area.’”220 The court concluded that the denial
was not based on substantial evidence and ordered the city to
grant the permit “without undue delay or obstacle ... not later
than ten days.”221 Generally, the “not in harmony” reasoning is
successful when the proposed tower is in a residential area and
is viewable from many homes or blocks residents’ view of a scenic landscape.222 In this case the proposed site was the parking
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
215 Id. at *4.
216 Id.
217 Id. at *5.
218 NE Colo. Cellular, Inc. v. City of N. Platte, No. 4:14-CV-3088, 2015 WL
3513963 (D. Neb. June 4, 2015).
219 Id. at *2.
220 Id. at *3.
221 Id. at *4, *8.
222 But see Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup Cty., 296 F.3d 1210, 1213 n.1
(11th Cir. 2002).
213
214
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lot for a bar and tobacco shop.223 The surrounding property was
zoned light industrial or highway commercial and included an
auto repair shop, a lot storing Army Reserve vehicles, and warehouses.224 Although there were a few residences in the area, one
complaining resident admitted that her house was an “oasis” in
a commercial area.225
The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Alabama in July 2016 heard a case with similar facts and
arrived at the same result: no substantial evidence to support
the city’s reasons for denying a permit for a cell tower in an area
zoned for community business districts.226 The city cited safety concerns including dangers from hazardous materials and storms,
but provided no evidence that the concerns were realistic.227
Residents also had aesthetic concerns, but protests about the
impact on views were not supported with photographs or any
other substantial evidence; their complaints were “generalized,”
not specifically about the tower and area at issue.228
Telecom companies have lost only a few tower-siting cases
in the last two years, one seemingly caused by the company’s
sloppy work, another because the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax
County, Virginia did its job well. In the former, Nextel Communications of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board.,229
Nextel did not comply with the local zoning ordinance because it
did not make a good faith effort for its proposed tower to provide
cell phone service by the least intrusive means.230 Nextel did not
contact the FCC or other companies to get any information about
NE Colo. Cellular, 2015 WL 3513963, at *4.
Id.
225 Id. at *6.
226 Cellular S. Real Estate, Inc. v. City of Mobile, No. 15-00387-CG-B, 2016
WL 3746661, at *9 (S.D. Ala. July 8, 2016).
227 Id. at *6.
228 Id. at *8; see also Cellular S. Real Estate, Inc. v. City of Germantown,
No. 2:12-cv-02888-JPM-tmp, 2015 WL 3852781, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. June 22,
2015) (finding no objective evidence of aesthetic impact of tower on neighborhood other than “isolated rendering” of tower); Verizon Wireless of the E. Ltd.
P’ship v. Columbia Cty., No. CV 114-211, 2015 WL 1877452, at *11 (S.D. Ga.
Apr. 23, 2015) (identifying no substantial evidence that tower posed safety
risk in face of unrefuted expert reports).
229 Nextel Commc’ns of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
No. 3:14-CV-2409, 2016 WL 1271385, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016).
230 Id. at *4–5.
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224
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co-location, which would have been preferable to the community.231
In order to show that its proposed tower would eliminate a significant gap, Nextel provided a propagation study and a drive test
report, but the results of the two were inconsistent so the zoning
board found the information unreliable, substantial evidence on
which to base its denial of a permit.232
In Cellco Partnership v. Board of Supervisors,233 Verizon
applied to the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors to construct
a 140-foot cell tower to remedy a service gap.234 The board’s main
objection was to the adverse visual impact on the local residential community and historical sites.235 The county’s comprehensive
plan requires new facilities to be designed so their visual presence
is “consistent with the character of the surrounding area.”236 The
board concluded that Verizon’s proposed tower would not be harmonious with its neighborhood and offered substantial evidence
for its conclusion: pictures and photo simulations based on a balloon fly test demonstrating that the tower would be visible from
twenty-two local residences; pictures demonstrating that the
tower would be at least four times the height of local homes and at
least twice the height of nearby trees; testimony that proposed
plantings would take ten years to grow to less than a quarter of
the tower’s height; testimony from a local realtor that the tower
would lower home prices; and specific evidence from numerous
residents.237 The court acknowledged the testimony of Verizon’s
experts about the need for the tower, but noted that “the views
of the community ‘will often trump those of … experts in the minds
of reasonable legislators.’”238 The court concluded that the board
had a large amount of evidence indicating that the proposed tower
was inconsistent with the county’s comprehensive plan, and those
inconsistencies provided substantial evidence supporting the
board’s decision to deny Verizon’s application.239 Supporting the
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6–7.
233 Cellco P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 140 F. Supp. 3d 548 (E.D. Va. 2015).
234 Id. at 554–55.
235 Id. at 557.
236 Id. at 565.
237 Id. at 568–70.
238 Id. at 576 (quoting AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of City of
Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 430–31 (4th Cir. 1998)).
239 Id. at 571.
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board’s position was the fact that it had approved 550 applications for wireless facilities, eighty-seven of them for Verizon, so
there was no reason for the court to find that the board was opposed to every facility.240
SOLUTIONS
Early on, the Second Circuit said it did not “read the [Act]
to allow the goals of increased competition and rapid deployment
of new technology to trump all other important considerations,
including the preservation of the autonomy of states and municipalities.”241 The Act’s basic notion was to allow local zoning authorities to maintain their control over their territories with a few
new limitations that would encourage cell phone service companies
to provide access to everyone.242 In hindsight, this arrangement
still seems like a good idea. Some commentators have approved
the Act as a cooperative model balancing the interests of local
governments with federal objectives.243 The problems are the
strong competing interests involved and the lack of specific definitions for the limitations.244 It would have been difficult to anticipate the specific differences of opinion that have arisen, but
once they did, members of Congress should have amended the
statute to deal with the problems that exist and the changes in
technology over the last twenty years. With twenty years of experience, the Act should no longer be a “make-work-for-attorneys”
act. However, with so much litigation from which to learn, all
interested parties should be able to better avoid it.
Residents of the Town of Ramapo in New York should
have been incensed that twelve years after the Act’s passage, its
planning board gave health risks as a significant reason for denying T-Mobile’s application to construct a cell phone tower
Id. at 586.
Sprint Spectrum, LP v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 639 (2d Cir. 1999).
242 See, e.g., Henry Goldberg, FCC’s Net Neutrality Decision Corrects Telecom Act Mistakes, THE HILL (Mar. 18, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress
-blog/technology/235985-fccs-net-neutrality-decision-corrects-telecom-act-mis
takes [https://perma.cc/XLL4-FFYN].
243 See, e.g., Adam J. MacLeod, Identifying Values in Land Use Regulations,
101 KY. L.J. 55, 84–85, 111–12 (2012–13); Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process
Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J. LEGIS. 289, 319 (2011).
244 See supra Sections II.A.1, II.B.
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within the town, even though the board knew that health concerns
are an illegitimate ground for a denial.245 The cases indicate that
local governments must read the statute and understand its
limitations;246 must have local zoning laws listing all the factors
that will be considered in deciding whether to approve an application to erect a cell tower and those factors may not be an absolute or a de facto ban on cell towers;247 must cite the local zoning
laws when denying an application to erect a cell tower;248 and
must support denials with specific evidence, not generalized
complaints, that may include testimony by local real estate
salespersons or appraisers;249 testimony by local residents that
names specific negative effects of the specific tower at issue;250
academic articles;251 and testimony by experts about radio frequency tests or drive-by tests or balloon demonstrations.252
For their part, residents who oppose a cell tower must also
do their homework to understand the statute and the kinds of
evidence that will support their claims. In particular, they have
to understand to avoid making claims about health concerns and
generalized claims about cell towers. Their opposition must be
based on specific complaints about their situation vis-a-vis the
proposed tower. Their complaints must be supported by evidence
that may include photographs of the existing residential area,
photographs of balloon tests, local realtor testimony about lost
sales and lower prices because of the threat of the proposed tower, and maps of local commercial areas better suited to accommodating a cell tower.253
T-Mobile N.E. LLC v. Town of Ramapo, 701 F. Supp. 2d 446, 461
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
246 See id.; Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 495 (2d
Cir. 2002).
247 See Omnipoint Holdings, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 586 F.3d 38, 49–50
(1st Cir. 2009); Vertex Dev., LLC v. Manatee Cty., 761 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1364
(M.D. Fla. 2011).
248 See New Par v. City of Saginaw, 301 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 2002).
249 See Vertex Dev., 761 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
250 BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Gwinnett Cty., 944 F. Supp. 923, 928 (N.D.
Ga. 1996).
251 See Vertex Dev., 761 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
252 See AT&T Mobility Serv., LLC v. Vill. of Corrales, No. 15-2069, 2016
WL 873398, at *5 n.3 (10th Cir. Mar. 8, 2016).
253 Vertex Dev., 761 F. Supp. 2d at 1361.
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Although telecom companies are well prepared with strategies and teams of legal and technical experts, they would save
time and money if they did not need to litigate after a permit
denial. It would be in their interest to help educate town boards
and residents about the Act and to hold meetings about potential sites before submitting permit applications. Commentators
in the field of conflict resolution have developed “The Mutual
Gains Framework” for “dealing with an angry public.”254 The
framework has six principles:
1. acknowledge the concerns of the other side;
2. encourage joint fact[-]finding;
3. offer contingent commitments to minimize impacts if they
do occur; promise to compensate unintended effects;
4. accept responsibility, admit mistakes, and share power;
5. act in a trustworthy fashion at all times; and
6. focus on building long-term relationships.255
The framework seems particularly well-suited to the conflict between telecom companies and local residents when the
issue is a cell tower. Residents want seamless cell phone service,
and federal law will not allow them to keep cell phone facilities out
of their towns. So they have an interest in working with a telecom
company so long as they believe they are being consulted, their
input is taken seriously, and a few will not have to bear the burden
alone so everyone may have adequate cell phone service. The creators of the framework have said they have seen positive results
in many cases in which the principles were used along with other
conflict resolution tools and techniques, but they admit that they
have not seen substantial changes in government or corporate
behavior.256 If telecom companies gave this method a chance, they
might find they could save considerable time and money.257
Susskind & Field, supra note 20.
Id.
256 Id.
257 See Merrick Hoben et al., Downed Lines: Best Practice for Improving Wireless Telecommunications Disputes, RIGHT OF WAY, Nov./Dec. 2006, http://
www.cbuilding.org/sites/default/files/TelecomDisputes.pdf [https://perma.cc
/Q64A-9TH8].
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